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  This paper reviews recent work examining two topics of economic research vital for invasive 
species policy—integration and valuation. Integration requires bioeconomic models that blend 
invasive biology with economic circumstances and the feedback loops between the two 
systems. Valuation requires nonmarket valuation associated with human and environmental 
damages posed by invasive species. We argue for a second-level of integration in invasive 
species economics—valuation based on integration models. Policy prescriptions based on 
integration models need valuation work; valuation surveys need integration models—the two 
are complements. Valuation could be enhanced with integration in mind; integration could be 
made better with valuation in mind. An example from blending the two research areas is 
presented and its merits demonstrated. 
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Invasive species questions have long challenged 
policymakers in many countries and organiza-
tions around the globe. In the United States, for 
instance, the number of non-native species is es-
timated to be as high as 50,000 (Pimentel et al. 
2000). Of these, some 5,000 have become es-
tablished, and of those about 500 have become 
invasive (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment 1993). An official invader is defined 
as a species that both is non-native and triggers 
costs to human or ecosystem health that outweigh 
any attendant benefits. Invasive species contrib-
ute to biodiversity loss and can cause large eco-
system changes (Mack et al. 2000, Mooney and 
Hobbs 2000). 
 
  The 2001 National Invasive Species Manage-
ment Plan highlighted the urgent need for more 
rigorous and comprehensive frameworks for in-
vasive species policy so that prevention and con-
trol strategies can be targeted appropriately (Na-
tional Invasive Species Council 2001, Committee 
on Environment and Natural Resources 1999, 
Federal Interagency Committee for the Manage-
ment of Noxious and Exotic Weeds 1998). Yet 
invasive species policy continues to be developed 
using inadequate quantitative scientific guidance, 
including a dearth of economic reasoning (see, 
e.g., Barbier 2001). Economic reasoning matters 
for invasive species policy because people are 
one of the main vectors of their spread around the 
globe. Historically, however, invasive species 
policy has been dominated by the biological sci-
ences and related disciplines. This trend is re-
versing, however, as over the last decade econo-
mists have become more involved in understand-
ing how basic economic principles such as rela-
tive prices, incentives, trade, and regulation work 
with biological circumstances to define the risks 
of damages caused by invasive species (see Per-
rings, Williamson, and Dalmazzone 2000). By 
including economics into policy debates, decision 
makers come closer to meeting President Clin-
ton’s Executive Order 13112, pledging decisions 
that work “to minimize the economic, ecological, 
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and human health impacts that invasive species 
cause.” 
  This paper reviews our recent work examining 
two economic research topics vital for better in-
vasive species policy—integration and valuation. 
By integration we mean bioeconomic models that 
blend invasive biology with economic circum-
stances and the feedback loops between the two 
systems so that we can better assess the risks 
posed by invaders. By valuation we mean the 
nonmarket valuation associated with reduced hu-
man and environmental damages posed by inva-
sive species so that we can better understand the 
net benefits of prevention, control, and eradica-
tion efforts. We also argue for a second level of 
integration in invasive species economics—
valuation based on integration models. The idea 
we stress is that integration models need valua-
tion work and valuation surveys need integration 
models—they are complements. Granted, com-
parative advantages exist in allowing modelers to 
model and valuationists to value; we still contend 
that working together can serve to improve both 
areas of research. Valuation could be enhanced 
with integration in mind; integration could be 
made better with valuation in mind. We focus 
first on integration and then valuation, and then 
provide an example of the blending of the two 
research areas. Finally, we offer some brief re-
marks on two directions of research in invasive 
species economics needing more attention—trade/ 





The key policy question is to determine the risks 
posed by invasive species. Models defining these 
risks, however, have for the most part been domi-
nated by the biological sciences. At first glance 
this makes sense because invasive species are a 
biological question. Traditionally, economists 
have stepped in at the end to evaluate the mone-
tary damages associated with different alerted 
states of nature. This is the classic “damage func-
tion” (DF) approach used to examine invasive 
species (see Freeman 1993, Perrings, Williamson, 
and Dalmazzone 2000). The DF approach as-
sumes that the economic system and the ecosys-
tem affect each other in a one-sided way. A 
change in the economic system is viewed as 
changing only the pressure on the ecosystem 
(e.g., Vitoussek et al. 1997), or a change in the 
ecosystem is viewed as changing only the eco-
nomic system (e.g., Daily 1997). The DF ap-
proach therefore does not address the idea of co-
evolution—the two-way interactions between 
human and natural systems (see Crocker and 
Tschirhart 1992). 
  Though the broad outlines of ecological-eco-
nomic system reciprocities have been acknowl-
edged, the acknowledgements usually lump to-
gether key parameters of one or both systems. 
The lumping hinders predictions and evaluations 
of which ecosystem services are to be usurped by 
humans, which waste flows are to be allowed to 
enter ecosystems, and which ecosystem biota and 
physical attributes are to be maintained. One can 
neither discriminate among the key parameters 
nor identify exactly how they enter the systems. 
Arguably the contributions of natural environ-
ments to human well-being depend as much upon 
the complex details of ecological and economic 
states as upon the gross relationships between 
ecological systems and economic systems. Those 
analyses capable of admitting both the empirical 
detail and the jointness of ecological and eco-
nomic systems are few (see Ayres and Kneese 
1969, Crocker and Tschirhart 1992). These gen-
eral equilibrium treatments work only with steady 
states. More recently, a few authors have set the 
structural details of jointness in a dynamic con-
text (e.g., Swallow 1996, Perrings 1998, Sohngen 
and Mendelsohn 1998, Brown and Layton 2001). 
  When an ecosystem changes, people change 
their behavior, which in turn reshapes the eco-
system, and so on. Ecosystem changes alter hu-
man productivity in the economic system. People 
recognize the change in their productivity when 
using the ecosystem, and they adapt to this 
change, either by adapting the environment or by 
adapting to the environment. When people adapt, 
they alter the pressure they put on the ecosystem, 
leading to further changes in the ecosystem. The 
cycle continues. Recent work has addressed 
whether an explicit accounting of the specifics of 
these feedback links between the two systems 
yields different policy-relevant results than does 
assuming that no joint determination occurs. Con-
sider three illustrations of three modeling ap-
proaches that create an explicit analytical frame-
work to integrate and account for feedbacks. 
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 The first illustration is the bioeconomic 
endogenous risk-stochastic dynamic program-
ming (SDP) model developed in Leung et al. 
(2002). They constructed a framework that incor-
porates assessment and management, includes 
uncertainty distributions, and optimizes preven-
tion and control options. Operationalizing the 
approach described by Shogren (2000) by using 
SDP, they were able to optimize strategies by 
forecasting into the future and accommodating 
expected changes, societal responses, and their 
feedback interactions. SDP accommodates envi-
ronmental changes, management responses to 
those changes, and in turn the impact of new 
management strategies on the environment. This 
enables the authors to identify the combination of 
prevention and control efforts that maximizes so-
cial welfare even given the uncertainty of inva-
sion events. SDP also allows the determination of 
the global optimum even for computationally dif-
ficult problems. SDP has been used in behavioral 
ecology to identify optimal foraging strategies 
(Mangel and Clark 1988), and in natural resource 
management, including biocontrol (Shea and Pos-
singham 2000, McCarthy, Possingham, and Gill 
2001). Following a hypothetical example, these 
authors applied the modeling framework to zebra 
mussel invasions of un-invaded lakes providing 
cooling water for power plants. Their results 
suggest that society should be spending about 
$240,000 per year to keep zebra mussels from 
invading each lake with a power plant to prevent 
fouling of pipes. This is in contrast to the 
$825,000 that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
spent in FY2001 for prevention and control ef-
forts for all aquatic nuisance species for all lakes. 
  The second modeling framework is the optimal 
control approach, as illustrated by, say, Olson and 
Roy (2002) and Settle, Crocker, and Shogren 
(2002). They constructed an integrated bio-
economic model to examine how invasive lake 
trout affect native cutthroat trout in Yellowstone 
Lake. Their optimal control/STELLA model 
simulated the integrated ecological-economic 
model of Yellowstone Lake to address three 
questions. First, they showed how the integration 
of the economic and biological systems leads to 
population results different from those from treat-
ing the two systems as separate. Consider now a 
sketch on how this approach would work for an 
example of an integrated bioeconomic model for 
invasive plants on agricultural lands. First, a 
plant-based ecosystem consists of two species—
the crop and invasive species—that interact with 
each other for survival. The populations of both 
plants are linked with each other: invasive species 
crowd crops for survival, and crops try to survive. 
We represent the interaction between the two 
species through two state equations for species 
populations: the population of invasive species 
and the population of crop at time t. The equation 
of motion for the invasive species is a function of 
the population of the species, the crop, farmer 
harvest of the invasive species, and a manager’s 
expenditures to cull invasive species. Assume that 
the population growth of the invasive species is 
an increasing function of its population and a 
decreasing function of culling. The equation of 
motion for crop is a function of populations of 
invaders, crops, and harvest. Let more crops in-
crease survival success, more invasive species 
cause more crop mortality, and greater harvest of 
the crop reduce the crop population. Using the 
population state equations, the steady state is de-
termined where the population has reached its 
new steady state and both populations are stable. 
Since reaching this new steady state equilibrium 
may take several decades or even centuries, the 
model can be used to account for both the differ-
ence between the two equilibria and the behavior 
in the intermediate time when the system is not in 
a steady state. 
  Second, one can now link the plant state equa-
tions to the two economic agents—the represen-
tative farmer and the manager. Harvest functions 
are defined to determine the removal rate of the 
invasive species given their populations and the 
time spent removing them by the average farmer. 
The harvest function for invasive species is a 
function of the population of invaders and the 
time spent killing the invasive species. The har-
vest function for the crop is a function of the 
population of the crop and the time spent har-
vesting the crop. The second link between the 
ecosystem and the economic system is through 
the manager. A manager directly interacts with 
the ecosystem by monitoring and controlling in-
vasive species to reduce pressure on the crop. The 
question is, how much pressure should the man-
ager put on invasive species to help the crop spe-
cies? Suppose that the manager has a fixed 
budget to allocate across his or her various ac-
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tivities that is determined by outside funding. 
Assume that the manager expends his fixed 
budget on one of two activities—culling invasive 
species or other activities in R&D to improve 
agricultural productivity. 
  Third, assume that a representative farmer 
splits his limited time between two activities: the 
farmer gains utility from the net profits from har-
vesting the crop given expenditures on harvesting 
and killing invasive species. These conditions 
define the optimal allocation of time between 
harvesting the crop and killing the invasive spe-
cies, as determined by the population of each spe-
cies in the ecosystem and the state of the R&D. 
Finally, suppose that a manager considers how 
much effort to devote to culling invasive species 
versus investing in R&D for improved productiv-
ity. Given the average farmer’s best-response 
functions on how he will respond to the current 
conditions of the field, the manager acts as a so-
cial planner and maximizes the discounted stream 
of intergenerational utility of future farmers. 
Given this framework, one can explore the im-
portance of including or excluding feedback 
loops between the systems. We will also explore 
alternative control policy strategies that relate to 
the invasive species under consideration. 
  The third modeling approach is the general 
equilibrium ecosystem modeling (GEEM) ap-
proach developed by Finnoff and Tschirhart 
(2003, 2005a) and applied to the problem of inva-
sive species in Finnoff and Tschirhart (2005b) 
and Finnoff, Strong, and Tschirhart (2005). The 
appeal of a general equilibrium (GE) approach for 
analyzing the ecosystem consequences of inva-
sion is similar to the appeal of GE in economics. 
GE methods allow for the representation of the 
feedback effects between all markets and agents 
in an economy. Because feedbacks abound in 
both economies and ecosystems, there are many 
problems that are intrinsically general equilibrium 
in nature. 
  One can exploit the similarities between econo-
mies and ecosystems to construct linked general 
equilibrium models of both systems. This GEEM 
approach avoids the tradition in economics of 
modeling ecosystems as a mere technical con-
straint on economic activity and explicitly repre-
sents the ecological system, the economic system, 
and their linkages. Finnoff and Tschirhart (2005a) 
link a dynamic economic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model with a dynamic general 
equilibrium ecosystem model (GEEM). CGE/ 
GEEM is applied to the Alaskan economy to 
value the welfare consequences of endangered 
Steller sea lion recovery measures via alternative 
pollock quotas (a primary prey species). The 
models are linked through two ecosystem ser-
vices, fishing and recreation, to an eight-species 
marine ecosystem. The bioeconomic model intro-
duced admits a second ecosystem service, and 
more importantly it accounts for how the two 
services are impacted by interactions within the 
eight-species ecosystem. Steller sea lion recovery 
measures via alternative pollock quotas are 
shown to result in regional welfare gains through 
altered levels of all ecosystem populations, eco-
nomic factor reallocation, changes in all regional 
prices, incomes, demands, outputs, imports, ex-
ports, and differential rates of factor accumula-
tion. 
  Of the eight species modeled, four are used 
directly in the economy either as consumption 
goods (fish) or non-consumption goods (marine 
mammals). While non-use values associated with 
the ecosystem (e.g., existence values) are not con-
sidered, all species have value for the economy 
because the other four species are used indirectly 
as support for ecosystem services. A portion of 
the regional welfare gains from reduced pollock 
quotas follow from the regional economy’s rely-
ing less on resource extraction ecosystem services 
and more on non-extraction ecosystem services. 
  With respect to invasive species, Finnoff and 
Tschirhart (2005b) extend the GEEM approach to 
describe a model of plant resource competition 
and how energy capture and allocation efficiency 
can determine the outcome of this competition. 
The method allows the identification of species 
that are likely to be successful invaders based on 
their individual physiological parameters. In 
many instances the parameters can be found in 
the existing botany literature or determined 
through experimentation. After identifying suc-
cessful invaders, the most effective means of pre-
venting their spread or controlling them once they 
are established can be related to how the means 
impact the physiological parameters. 
  Finnoff, Strong, and Tschirhart (2005) consider 
multiple simultaneous invasions of rangeland by 
annual grasses (cheatgrass) and forbs (leafy 
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spurge). Focusing on rangeland stocking deci-
sions reveals the critical roles played by producer 
foresight and lease duration on the speed of leafy 
spurge invasion. By incorporating the resource 
competition process of multiple plant species, the 
results indicate that although leafy spurge may 
not exist in a non-foraging equilibrium, once 
grazing animals are introduced at profitable levels, 
a niche may be created within the ecosystem, 
allowing spurge the potential to thrive. This niche 
creation would not have been observed in a 
standard single-species bioeconomic model. The 
use of GEEM provides insights on how within-
period competition may drive the population 
dynamics across time. Even small perturbations 
across longer time horizons can have drastically 
different effects on the ecosystem, and in turn on 
the economic health. 
  A key to integration work is to decide whether 
including all the details and all the feedback loops 
between the ecological and economic system is 
worth the trouble. More detail is better only if one 
can make better predictions about both systems. 
Settle, Crocker, and Shogren (2002) find that 
integration matters a great deal for predictions 
about the physical environment. Using the popu-
lation of cutthroat trout as a yardstick, they found 
that ignoring feedbacks biases risk estimates by 
overestimating cutthroat populations in the worst 
case and by underestimating them in the best-case 
scenario. The difference arises from fishermen’s 
behavior. Without feedback, fishermen continue 
to fish as before, putting constant pressure on the 
cutthroat. With feedback, fishermen exploiting 
declining cutthroat populations adapt by fishing 
less and visiting other attractions more. They also 
found a troubling result from a species protection 
perspective—based on visitor preferences, a small 
difference between the present value of net bene-
fits between the best- and worst-case scenarios 
existed, which suggested that the gill-netting 
policy for lake trout was inefficient. 
  Other cases can differ. Finnoff, Strong, and 
Tschirhart (2005) consider two feedback loops 
for zebra mussels in a representative lake in the 
Midwest—the link between the biological system 
and firms, and the link between the manager and 
the firm. For both loops, the beliefs of the deci-
sion maker in question regarding invasions are 
central. In the absence of the link between the 
biological system and firms, the firm behaves as 
if there is no change in the biological system. The 
firm either uses too few or too many inputs rela-
tive to the optimal baseline. In turn, output corre-
spondingly either under- or over-shoots its tar-
geted level; either way, this results in opportunity 
cost losses from production shortages or surplus, 
determined ex-post. For the case of the benevo-
lent manager and firm, removing feedback causes 
the manager to act as if the firm does not respond 
to changes in state. When excluding feedbacks, 
the model necessarily determines the conse-
quences of the invasion and behavior of firms, 
even though the firm or social planner does not 
take them into account. The results suggest that 
including feedbacks matters, but not in every di-
mension. Both biological and economic conse-
quences of not addressing feedbacks are sensitive 
to the initial conditions of the environment, be-
havioral perceptions about the state of the envi-






All integration models make some presumption 
about the relative costs and benefits of invasive 
species, usually based on the best market data 
available. And in general, the most visible costs 
and benefits of invasive species neglect or control 
have primarily been the numbers generated by 
Pimentel et al. (2000), who are biologists. Most 
economists are skeptical about these numbers be-
cause they are derived from a summation of re-
placement costs. Seen in engineering economics, 
these numbers are constructed by simply multi-
plying price times quantity rather than by using 
the standard surplus welfare measures developed 
over two centuries of research. 
 Consider now an economic framework to 
establish values for reducing some of the risks 
posed by invasive species. Following Rosen 
(1988), consider a valuation model constructed 
under the assumption that invasion time (or time 
when damages occur) is a known parameter. This 
reflects a common belief (by biologists and 
economists) that these invasions are inevitable, 
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and that it is just a matter of time until they occur. 
In this setting the objective is to determine a rep-
resentative individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) 
to delay the inevitable invasion. This presumes an 
invasion  will occur at some point in time, our 
interest thus being in the value of delaying this 
certainty. 
  Another characteristic of this setting is that with 
a certainty of invasion, control is the only rele-
vant investment. To determine the WTP to mar-
ginally delay invasion damages—the WTP to 
delay the inevitable, i.e., temporary prevention—
it is necessary to construct a model of intertempo-
ral behavior with periodic utility defined over 
consumption and environmental quality. A repre-
sentative individual is framed as facing an inter-
temporal budget constraint and making choices to 
maximize his or her utility over non-invaded and 
invaded states. In the non-invaded state, the indi-
vidual receives constant utility from the corre-
sponding environmental quality. When the inva-
sion occurs, utility depends on consumption minus 
some market damage and the lower level of 
environmental quality. As expenditures influence 
only market damages, the setting is purely self-
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0 U  is the constant utility in the non-in-
vaded state, ρ is the rate of time preference, 
1 U  is 
the utility in the invaded state, c is the consump-
tion in period t, α is the proportion of damages 
faced by the individual, D is the damage function 
where Dx ≤ 0, x is the monetary contribution to 
invasion prevention/control,  x   is all contributions 
by other parties, Q
1 is the environmental quality 
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(1) by assuming that either ρ or T is sufficiently 
large such that e
–ρT → 0










UU c tD x t x t Q U e d t
−ρ
τ
=− α + − +
ρ ∫  . 
The constant 
0 / U ρ  may be dropped since any 





, (() ( () () ) , ) .
T
t
cx UU c tD x t x t Q U e d
−ρ
τ





  The individual’s intertemporal expenditures are 
constrained by his endowed wealth, W, he is as-
sumed to confront a pure-consumption-loans 
market at interest rate r, and he cannot die in debt. 
Thus he exhausts his wealth over the course of 
his lifetime, so the choice of consumption path 
c(t) is constrained by 
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The associated Lagrangian can then be formed: 
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where λ is the shadow value of an increment in 
wealth. Differentiating (4) with respect to con-
sumption and control expenditures and assuming 
an interior solution leads to the following first-
order conditions (supplemented with a binding 
budget constraint): 
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Subscripts and primes indicate derivatives. Equa-
tion (5) requires that the individual consume until 
the discounted marginal utility of consumption 
equates the discounted value of an increment in 
wealth. Similarly, (6) requires the individual to 
invest in control of the invader until the dis-
counted marginal utility of control equates the 
discounted value of an increment in wealth. To-
gether, these conditions require the individual to 
divide his expenditures between consumption and 
control (post invasion) so that the periodic mar-
 Shogren, Finnoff, McIntosh, and Settle  Integration-Valuation Nexus in Invasive Species Policy   17 
 
ginal rate of substitution between the two goods 
is unity (ratio of prices, both one). 
  The value of delaying a harmful invasion by a 
marginal amount can be interpreted as simply 
what an individual would be willing to pay to stay 
in the non-invaded state an increment of time 
longer. This can be found by applying the enve-
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0  and Dx < 0, the value term 
is always positive and equal to the discounted 
difference in utility from the invaded state to the 
non-invaded state over the marginal benefit of 
invasion control expenditures. 
  The key to such valuation exercises is that they 
are based on plausible scenarios that account for 
both economic circumstances and biological pa-
rameters, and the feedbacks between the systems. 
Developing scenarios for people to value without 
accounting for the ecological economic interde-
pendencies can lead to biased valuation estimates, 
at best, or off-point numbers at worst—ones that 
do not capture or relate to the underlying physical 
and social problems associated with the invasive 
species. Consider now one example in which we 
used both an integrated model and a valuation 
survey to estimate the value of protecting cut-
throat trout in Yellowstone. 
 
 
An Application of a Joint Integration-
Valuation Approach 
 
We combined integrated models and valuation to 
measure preferences for reduced risks to the na-
tive species cutthroat trout in Yellowstone Na-
tional Park [for complete details see Settle and 
Shogren (forthcoming)]. The survey was designed 
to explore the degree to which people are con-
cerned about protecting a native species like cut-
throat trout within the Park against threats from 
invasive species like lake trout. The goal was to 
apply into the field the insight of laboratory 
valuation work from the past decade, and to use 
our empirical results to parameterize the compos-
ite visitor’s demand within an integrated bio-
economic model. Using a seven-step experimen-
tal strategy, we created a Yellowstone Interactive 
Survey. 
  The first step was to develop wildlife lotteries 
to which people can assign an economic value. 
These wildlife lotteries represent the probability 
that a visitor will experience a species and the 
core attractions. Due to the large number of pos-
sible permutations for the set of wildlife lotteries, 
we limited our probability distributions of species 
to those most important in order to parameterize 
the integrated bioeconomic model. The 90 lottery 
pairs capture the reality of most environmental 
policy by defining many of our wildlife lotteries 
as low-probability/high-outcome lotteries. 
 The second step was to use market-like 
arbitrage as a disciplining device in valuation. 
Asking people to value low-probability/high-
outcome lotteries introduces the possibility that 
people might not act as rational as expected utility 
theory presumes. The fear was that people could 
have inconsistent preferences over the wildlife 
lotteries, and therefore state inconsistent values. 
Rational valuation is defined by consistency be-
tween valuation and preference. One solution to 
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this is to introduce arbitrage into the experimental 
design. Following Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren 
(2003), over the course of 10 rounds, each partici-
pant was presented with two lottery markets side-
by-side. One market was a real market: people 
played money lotteries for actual cash. For these 
real lotteries, we also used a low probability of a 
high payout and a high probability of a low 
payout. The second market was hypothetical wild-
life lotteries: people played these lotteries but did 
not get paid in cash. 
  The third step was to construct the actual 
interactive valuation survey questions such that 
they matched up with the integrated model. The 
instructions explained each stage in the survey: 
each person was presented with two separate 
situations, each with two options (option A and 
B). Each person said which option he or she pre-
ferred in each situation (A or B), and then stated a 
dollar value for the two options in both situations. 
The people were aware that a computer market 
could buy, sell, or trade with them in situation 1 
according to indicated preferences and values. At 
the end of a round, the next round appeared with 
a new initial money balance in situation 1 and 
new options for both situations. Once they com-
pleted the last round, we determined their earn-
ings for the survey. 
  The fourth and fifth steps were the actual 
implementation of the survey inside the Park and 
over the Internet. In the Park sessions, we set up 
tables outside the Visitors Center at the south 
entrance to Yellowstone and Grand Teton Na-
tional Parks. Visitors were asked if they would be 
willing to participate in an experiment taking 
about 30 minutes on laptop computers set up on 
the tables. We also ran the survey over the Inter-
net and attracted participants through a paid 
advertisement run over 5 weeks on the New York 
Times web page (www.nytimes.com). Focusing 
on Park visitors and New York Times web read-
ers further suggests that our valuation estimate 
reflects an upper bound on the composite per-
son’s value for cutthroat. 
  The sixth step was to evaluate the valuation 
statements. For tractability, assume that the aver-
age respondent’s willingness to pay function is 
separable in each argument—e.g., the value of 
catching a cutthroat trout does not depend on 
whether you have seen the core attractions of the 
park. We used this assumption to back out the 
value of each probability from a large number 
and different types of lottery pairs. Using this 
method, we estimated values for each of the spe-
cies in the park. 
  The final step was to add the estimated values 
as parameters in the integrated model. We next 
determined the value for each of the probabilities 
of seeing/catching each species and used these 
estimates to parameterize the value to see/catch 
each species in our composite visitor’s welfare 
function. If a visitor valued a cutthroat trout at $4 
and had a 25 percent chance of catching one, the 
visitor valued that 25 percent chance in the lottery 
at $1. The values for each species were included 
in our welfare function used in the simulations to 
measure the welfare to visitors of visiting Yellow-
stone National Park. 
  The results from the combination of integration 
and valuation were interesting. While integrating 
economics and biology was worth the effort for 
predicting physical changes, we found it did not 
matter for welfare estimates. We estimate a trivial 
difference between the present value of net bene-
fits between the best- and worst-case scenarios. 
The average person surveyed cared more about 
improving road quality than protecting cutthroat 
trout. His bumper sticker would read “fix the 
roads, forget the fish.” This suggests that if Park 
managers want to justify cutthroat trout protec-
tion based on visitor preferences, they would 
benefit from better educational tools to close the 
gap between today’s average visitor and the far-
sighted eco-tourist. Regardless, the point is that 
the valuation exercise was guided by the demands 
of an integrated model and that the structure of 
the integrated model was affected by what needed 
to be valued. Future work exploring this second 





Economics serves a role in invasive species man-
agement through integration of economic and 
physical circumstances, and a better idea on how 
people value prevention, control, and eradication. 
Herein we focused on integration and valuation 
given our work over the last decade, stressing the 
usefulness of more research that blends the two 
areas. We close now by briefly identifying two 
additional critical invasive species topics needing 
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more economic attention—trade/growth and in-
centive design. First, we know that the interna-
tional movement of people, goods, and raw mate-
rials has amplified the rate at which species move 
beyond their natural environs. While most inva-
sive species do not survive in their new habitats, 
those that do live generate substantial financial 
damages at the local and national level. Future 
research should possibly continue to consider bio-
logical invasions as an unintended by-product of 
capital accumulation and trade policy (e.g., Bar-
bier and Shogren 2004, Costello and McAusland 
2003). Production in the economy is the outcome 
of decentralized decision making by firms such 
that any increase in an individual firm’s capital 
stock carries the risk of causing a parallel in-
crease in the total stock of biotic invaders. One 
could examine potential spillover effects from an 
increase in this stock of invasive species as a 
direct negative impact on the productivity of all 
firms, a direct negative or positive impact on the 
utility of people, and an increase in the risk of 
future loss of welfare. The open public policy 
question in trade and growth is what view should 
dominate—that of the experts or lay public—
when people gain welfare from the invader (e.g., 
muted swans, ornamental flowers). 
  Finally, studying the design of incentive mecha-
nisms to minimize risks of invasive species on 
native species should be a priority (e.g., see Horan 
and Lupi 2005). Invasive species are the second 
leading risk to native species. Many invasive spe-
cies flourish along the edges of the habitat re-
serve. Invasive plants can penetrate the habitat 
reserve for up to five kilometers, reducing the 
quality of the habitat along the edge. Also, the 
habitat edges are susceptible to nest parasitism 
and increased threat of endangered species to pre-
dation by invasive species. To mitigate the influ-
ence of invasive species, many scientists have 
recommended designing habitat reserves that maxi-
mize the portion of the conserved acres that 
contribute to the core habitat area as opposed to 
the share in which habitat quality is jeopardized 
due to edge effects. Further, given limited conser-
vation dollars, designing habitat reserves to mini-
mize edge effects, thereby reducing the predation 
of invasive species, will also create larger core 
habitat areas for native species, providing them 
the highest probability of survival. The idea is to 
study cost-effective incentive mechanisms to ag-
glomerate habitat, private or public or both, in 
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